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Abstract 
The aim of this article is to examine the way technological developments and the 
internationalisation of the television industry affects public television (PTV) 
broadcasters in Europe. The work focuses on the policies pursued by PTV 
broadcasters in selected European countries in response to the challenges that 
confront them in the era of digital convergence. The changes in the European 
television landscape force public channels to rethink their position towards new 
digital technologies, organisational structures and programming policy and 
scheduling. To illustrate the difficulties but also the opportunities that arise during 
this period of change, the article analyses specific activities and strategies 
undertaken by public channels in the main areas examined (reorganisation, 









New communications technologies such as digitalisation and convergence, the growing 
internationalisation of the industry and the emergence of transnational corporations, 
alongside profound economic, social and political shifts have contributed to the 
emergence of a new television order and caused multi-faceted pressures on former PTV 
broadcaster monopolies. The public TV sector reacted in various ways to this situation. 
Each PTV broadcaster exists and operates within a specific environment, in which room 
for manoeuvre and initiative taking depends on many factors, including history, 
traditions, language and culture, the political climate, the level of economic development, 
the size of the market, the technological infrastructure and the regulatory framework. 
Other factors include the readiness of public channels to respond to the demands of the 
competitive digital era, which in turn depends on organisational reform, programming 
policy, and involvement in new technologies. These factors can hinder potential 
strategies and at times limit the public sector’s room for manoeuvre. This explains to 
some extent the important differences observed in the initiatives undertaken by different 
public channels. 
This article focuses on the policies pursued by PTV broadcasters in selected 
European countries in response to the challenges that confront them in the era of digital 
convergence. The changes in the European television landscape force public channels to 
rethink their position towards new digital technologies, organisational structures, and 
programming policy and scheduling. To illustrate the difficulties but also the 
opportunities that arise during this period of change, the article analyses specific 
activities and strategies undertaken by public channels in the main areas examined 
(reorganisation, programming and technology) in France and Greece. These have been 
selected on the basis of presenting a combination of large and small countries, which 
have different levels of competition in the field of television. Further, the selection of 
these two Southern European countries has also been made to highlight the partisan 
political control of television which is featured in both media systems and the difficulty 
in developing a vibrant and independent public TV sector under such conditions.The 
article starts by defining the role of public television and outlining developments in the 
sector across Europe. It then moves on to analysing the competition, programming, 
funding and organisational strategies employed by PTV broadcasters to face the pressures 
that are apparent in the digital world. The second part of the article investigates the 
policies adopted by the French and Greek PTV broadcasters in the areas of new digital 
technology, programming and internal restructuring to survive in the current broadcasting 
ecology. 
Part I 
Public television in Europe 
Public television can play an essential role in safeguarding a pluralist society and meeting 
its cultural and social needs and it is therefore at the heart of the democratic systems. 
Through its mass reach and influence PTV broadcasting has the capacity both to enrich 
people’s lives as individuals and improve the quality of life in society. In Europe public 
TV occupies an important part of the television sector. It is not considered merely an 
economic activity, as it is in the USA, but rather a social and political tool, accessible to 
all and contributing to pluralism, diversity and democratic expression. Historically, 
monopolies in television (and radio) were justified on technical grounds (spectrum 
scarcity), but a raft of political and social arguments were added to these technical 
reasons, as it was believed that broadcast media could exert powerful influence and had 
to therefore be heavily regulated (Humphreys 1996: 112–113; Iosifidis, Steemers and 
Wheeler 2005: 9). With the notable exception of Luxembourg, which never experienced 
state control in the sector, as well as the United Kingdom, Belgium (Wallonia) and 
Finland, where private television was introduced in the 1950s, PTV broadcasters in 
Europe functioned under a monopoly regime until the 1980s and constituted the sole 
source of information and entertainment. 
However, the organisation and functioning of public channels are not the same 
across Europe, for they vary in the way they are funded and structured, their political 
independence and so on. For example, revenues of the British PTV broadcaster BBC and 
Swedish SVT derive almost exclusively from the licence fee, but the income of the 
Spanish TVE comes mainly from advertising and state grants. Greece’s national public 
broadcaster ERT is funded by a surcharge on electricity bills. In the Netherlands the 
Parliament decided in 2004 to replace the licence fee by a special levy as a supplement to 
income tax. Apart from differences in funding, PTV broadcasters differ among 
themselves in structural terms. For instance, while TVE in Spain is characterised by an 
integrated structure, controlling every area of TV activity, local governments oversee the 
autonomous regional public TV stations across the country. Also some countries (France, 
Spain and Greece) witnessed the emergence of state rather than public broadcasting. The 
difference between public and state television lies in the degree of its independence from 
political power. While state television promotes the interest of the state, that is the 
government, public television enjoys autonomy and editorial independence. In France, 
Spain, Italy and Greece, conditions variously defined as ‘political clientelism’ or ‘state 
paternalism’, have prevented the full emancipation of public television from direct 
political control (Council of Europe 2004). In France and Italy state broadcasters began to 
be transformed into public service broadcasters in the 1970s, whereas in Spain and 
Greece the dictatorships of Franco and the Colonels respectively delayed the 
transformation processes.  
Therefore there is a notable difference between state and public PTV broadcasting, with 
the latter enjoying political independence. But even the flagship of independent 
broadcasters, the BBC, was attacked by the British government over its coverage of the 
Falklands war in the 1980s as well as the 2003 war in Iraq. However, the differences in 
the organisation and functioning of public television are not limited to the degree of 
political independence. Some large PTV broadcasters have expanded internationally (the 
BBC, France Télévisions and the Spanish TVE) or embarked on cross-border cooperation 
(the Swedish SVT with other Nordic broadcasters), but others have focused on the 
domestic market due to small size and language barriers (the Greek ERT and the Irish 
RTÉ). Broadly speaking, the large variations among the broadcasting systems stem from 
the different traditions, political cultures as well as regulatory systems that exist across 
Europe. It follows therefore that it is difficult to identify a single public television model 
or accurately define public television. This means that any attempt to compare public 
television systems across Europe and bring for(published by Intellect, ISSN: 1757-2681 
(special issue). 
ward workable suggestions on their functioning should be conducted carefully 
and should fully acknowledge these differences. In general terms, however, there are 
some common obligations bestowed upon public TV by society which define the remit of 
its activities. These obligations can be summarised as follows (Garnham 1986; Curran 
1991; Keane 1991; Murdock 1992; Graham and Davis 1997; Tracey 1998)<<?2>>: (1) 
universality of content and access; (2) provision of programmes which contribute to 
social cohesion and democratic process; (3) setting of high-quality standards in the areas 
of entertainment, education and information; (4) contribution to political pluralism and 
cultural diversity; (5) enriching the lives of individuals through history, the arts and 
science; (6) preservation and promotion of national culture and heritage; (7) editorial 
independence and accountability; and (8) serving the needs of an increasingly multi-
cultural society (new obligation). 
Public television in a competitive market 
Whereas public television enjoyed a monopoly status in the past and there was little 
debate on its legitimacy, technological developments, political and economic changes, 
socio-cultural shifts as well as regulatory changes have cast into doubt, not only the way 
public television is financed, but also its very raison d’etre. Inevitably European public 
channels face a series of dilemmas which fall into four main areas. 
Competition and programming strategies. 
 The abolition of state monopolies and the introduction of competition in the audiovisual 
sector have put public television stations in a inferior position vis-à-vis commercial 
channels. Although PTV broadcasters make efforts to respond to these new conditions, 
these efforts are limited by the fact that they have a social mission to fulfill, namely 
defending the public interest (that is to provide programming diversity, ensure viewer 
access and guarantee accuracy and impartiality). Carrying out this mission means that 
public channels have to offer quality (therefore high-cost) informative, educational and 
entertainment services, not normally provided in the free market. The obligation of public 
television to preserve the nation’s culture, offer educational services and cater for 
minorities does not make it easy to compete directly with private broadcasters. 
However, failure to deliver popular programmes that attract large audiences may 
result in a competitive disadvantage. One senses a disturbing contradiction between the 
necessity for PTV broadcasters to be aggressive in the market-place and their public 
service obligations (Padovani and Tracey 2003: 133). Therefore, the dilemma posed is 
the following: should public television stations continue to act in compliance with their 
statutory remit, or should they adopt competitive tactics similar to those of private 
channels? In other words, should they take part in the battle for ratings and therefore offer 
services similar to the private sector (where at times profit prevails to the detriment of 
programme quality)? Or should they focus on services that the private sector by 
definition does not cover? But if they choose the latter scenario, they may not be in a 
position to maintain audience shares at a reasonable level (around 20 per cent), so as to 
defend their position as servants of the public interest. As we shall see below, public 
channels are already in a ratings battle and some of them have adopted a more 
mainstream programming approach to address the competitive challenge. 
Funding method. 
 The licence fee constitutes the main source of revenue for public television in Europe. 
Additional revenues come from advertising, sales of programmes and television 
magazines, government subsidies and subscription income. In the days of monopoly, it 
was much easier to justify the licence fee, but this collective funding system has come 
under intensive pressure owing to technological developments which have allowed many 
more channels in the market. The fact that advertising and other commercial revenues 
constitute only supplementary resources for the majority of public television channels, 
combined with the unwillingness of most governments to increase the licence fee to the 
required level of inflation, has caused economic difficulties for public broadcasters. In 
addition, discussions have for some time been taking place at a European level about how 
to reduce public television’s dependency on the licence fee and find more efficient and 
rational methods of funding it in the digital multi-channel era. 
The choice of the funding scheme can influence the activities of public channels, 
and in particular, the content of their programme offerings. According to McKinsey & 
Company (1999, 2004) funding by the licence fee reduces dependence on advertising, 
avoids direct competition with commercial broadcasters and allows public channels to 
formulate a programming strategy that includes distinctive, innovative and risky 
programmes. Private broadcasters often accuse public ones of using public money for 
commercial activities and populist programmes offered by the free market anyway, 
therefore, resulting in market distortion and unfair competition. Despite numerous 
complaints lodged with the European Commission relating to financing systems, the EC 
rejected practically all of them and declared the use of the licence fee compatible with the 
Treaty. Still, such developments have caused confusion and created uncertainty about 
future revenue levels for public channels, thus putting a brake on investment, and pushing 
up operational costs. 
Investment in new technologies. 
 The question initially posed regarding the rapid development of new communications 
technologies is whether public television stations should take advantage of alternative 
ways of transmitting their programmes. Should they be allowed to provide thematic 
channels, or services on the Internet, for example? It is worth noting that across the EU 
27 only in the United Kingdom and Spain it is explicitly stated in the public broadcaster’s 
remit that they should embark on digital activities. But in practice it is mainly large 
public TV broadcasters who have done so. One argument in favour of this practice is that 
investment in new communication technologies allows public channels to re-acquire their 
competitive advantage and therefore play a leading role in the new era. Another is that 
public television should be present on all platforms and ensure that digital content is 
accessible to all citizens to fulfill the universality principle. This can be achieved by 
offering a free-to-air package and by promoting a common, open standard for the 
broadcasting of digital television signals that would address the problem of closed, 
proprietary technical standards. This guarantees participation and promotes wide-spread 
take-up of digital technologies. As we will see below, most public broadcasters have 
launched, or participate in, free-to-view digital consortia. 
Also, some large public broadcasters have already invested in areas such as the 
Internet and multimedia, whereas PTV broadcasters in some of the smaller countries are 
still in the planning stage. The dilemma, however, has to do as much with the means of 
funding these initiatives as with the access of viewers to new services. In fact, the method 
of funding such activities determines the level of access viewers can enjoy. For example, 
if the new services are funded by subscriptions, then they will be accessible only to those 
who can afford the subscription, thereby sacrificing the universality principle. If on the 
other hand they are funded by the licence fee, then they are accessible to all. This 
scenario, however, logically presupposes increasing the licence fee at regular intervals to 
cover this investment, something which national governments are on the whole unwilling 
to implement because of the political fall-out. 
Organisational reform. 
 Long-term operational and organisational strategies for PTV broadcasters are essential 
to address commercial changes, shifts in audience preferences, as well as technological 
advancements. The search for new content, but also for new centres of production and 
organisational units able to meet new demands, presupposes the creation of a modern and 
rational organisational model elaborated and designed by specialist advisers, external 
managers and consultants, who can clarify priorities and look for specific objectives, 
rather than vague principles. As Coppens and Saeys (2006) argue, the pre-eminent 
instrument for a more specific definition of tasks is the public service contract. While 
laws and/or decrees continue to lay down a number of principles, the specific tasks 
themselves are defined in the contracts. A growing number of countries, including 
Britain, France, Ireland and Sweden have specified the mission of their PTV broadcasters 
in contracts, while the television systems of some of the southern European countries 
such as Spain and Greece have no contracts as yet. Most contracts urge the PTV 
broadcaster to adopt a more modern human-resources policy, spend public money 
efficiently and justify their financial resources, increase revenue from self-help activities 
such as overheads reduction and job redundancies. As a result the mission of PTV, 
broadcasting is increasingly defined in terms of specific and measurable targets. 
The merit of these new administrative guidelines for PTV broadcasters, in which 
the public service contract is a basic element, is that they urge public corporations to be 
held more answerable to the community that they serve. However, the new administrative 
system may place too tight restrictions on the broadcaster’s autonomy, for the assessment 
of the broadcaster’s performance can be submitted to the relevant political authorities 
who will appraise it from their own perspective and perhaps impose sanctions (Coppens 
and Saeys 2006). Another drawback of encouraging a more management-oriented 
approach is that the public sector may operate openly on the basis of commercial criteria 
and no longer as a public service. Moreover, a Council of Europe report (2004: 15) points 
out that it has been proved difficult to develop a managerial culture required to downsize 
the organisations, reduce staffing, cut costs and promote cost-effectiveness and efficiency 
because labour laws generally prevent easy dismissal of personnel and in any case most 
attempts to carry through reform have become bogged down in political conflicts. Even 
though the broadcasters’ attempts to re-organise are necessary for survival, these attempts 
are often troubled. 
Part II 
The above constitute but a small part of the complex web of dilemmas that emerge in the 
new television order, characterised by the development of new communications 
technologies, the prevalence of market forces, the liberalisation and the 
internationalisation of television markets, as well as the convergence of technologies. 
Despite the existence of different public broadcasting systems, the dilemmas and the 
problems that public channels face today are common among European PTV 
broadcasters. But how have public channels responded to these challenges and dilemmas? 
This section analyses the technological, programming and organisational strategies that 
public channels in selected European countries have adopted to address these concerns 
and adjust to the digital era. More specifically, the analysis focuses on the digital 
initiatives, programming/scheduling and internal restructuring attempts of one large 
public broadcaster (France Télévisions) and one small (the Greek public broadcaster 
ERT). The data regarding programming and scheduling help us to assess whether the 
public organisations have become more commercial to face competition and whether in 
the process have abandoned their public service remit. The information about digital 
activities enables us to check whether the relevant public channels have taken advantage 
of the new communication technologies and platforms and have therefore turned into 
Public Service Media. Further, the analysis of internal restructuring strategies considers 
the steps taken by the public TV sector to combat bureaucracy and inefficiency. In sum, 
the examination of the above three areas in a small and a large European country 
highlights the readiness (or not) of the public sector to adapt to the digital age.  
The investigation of a large and a small territory is important because it takes into 
account the relative sizes of the internal markets, and thus defines in business terms PTV 
broadcasters’ room for manoeuvre. The size of the market usually defines the relative 
strength of a country in the television sector and its capability to develop an autonomous 
television system with strong production units. The selected countries illustrate different 
levels of competition and development in the field of television and also in all converged 
media. The marked differences can be attributed partly to the size of a national market, 
partly to the regulatory framework, and partly to the political and economic climate. 
Observing national experiences gives us a picture of the way in which external factors 
(for example the level of competition in television or the effectiveness of the regulatory 
framework) influence the ability of public broadcasters to compete with the private 
sector. The examination of the areas that are more directly controlled by public channels 
(internal reorganisation, programming policy and digital initiatives) highlights the 
readiness of the public sector to adapt to the digital age. 
The selection of these two Southern European countries has also been made to 
highlight the partisan political control of television which is featured in both media 
systems and the difficulty in developing a vibrant and independent public TV sector 
under such conditions. In France, the government considered it necessary to intervene in 
the television sector to safeguard and promote national culture and identity. In France as 
in Greece (and Spain and Italy for that matter) one can find some degree of political 
subordination of public television by the government. In Greece, state broadcaster ERT 
was seen as a mouthpiece of the government. Greece, along with Spain, represents a 
model closer to the East European situation, where deregulation of television emerged in 
an unstable political and social environment. Nowadays one can observe major shifts in 
the media ecology in both countries under scrutiny. Market dynamics has resulted in a 
profound transformation of the French and Greek television systems since the late 1980s, 
bringing about a multiplication of media outlets and enhancing choice. However, state 
policy in television is still determined to a large extent by the persistent culture of 
political expediency and pluralism is hard to secure especially in news and political 
coverage as political elites constantly seek to influence the content of political coverage. 
These phenomena are typical of the European south, in direct contrast to the European 
north where the television systems are characterised by political autonomy and 
independence.1 
The French case 
Following the privatisation of formerly public channel TF-1 in 1986, France 2 and France 
3 are the main remaining public stations which are competing openly with the powerful 
private channels TF-1, Canal Plus and M6, which have substantial financial resources. 
However, France Télévisions (the company under which all public broadcasters operate, 
including France 5 which was launched in 2001) has managed to retain satisfactory levels 
of audience share. In particular, in 2006 France 2 enjoyed a share of 20.5 per cent, 
followed by France 3 at 16.7 per cent and France 5 at 3 per cent. Regarding funding, 
France Télévisions is funded by a mixed system of commercial revenues (mainly 
advertising) and the licence fee, although this may change in the future following 
President Sarkozy’s suggestion to take away advertising from public channels. 
Occasionally, the public broadcaster receives special state subsidies to pursue specific 
objectives, such as the dissemination of French programmes abroad. 
Organisational reform. 
 The PTV broadcaster has been benefited by a major restructuring programme which led 
to the formation of France Télévisions to combine the resources of the public channels. 
This change has improved the organisational and operational profile of the now joint 
stock company and led to a better exploitation of programmes and personnel, resulting in 
trimming running costs at a saving of about fifty to fifty-two million Euros a year since 
the beginning of the new century (James 2005). Overheads were cut and management 
streamlined, with the result that net debt has fallen from 245 million Euros at the end of 
1999 to 109.6 million Euros in 2003 (IsICult 2004). Heavy losses have turned into a net 
profit of 14.2 million Euros in 2003. France Télévisions grew its advertising by 4.9 per 
cent in 2002 to 710 million Euros, while in 2003 advertising grew again by 6.8 per cent 
to reach 820 million Euros 
Programming policy. 
 One reason commonly cited for France Télévisions’ robust showing, as evidenced by 
the relatively high shares enjoyed by public channels, is a distinctive programming 
policy. According to a report by the Instituto Italiano per l’Industria Culturale, published 
by Screen Digest, France Télévisions has steered clear of many of the reality-TV formats 
taken up by commercial channels and has instead focused on regional and local issues 
(especially through France 3), news and current affairs magazines, high-quality fiction 
and documentaries (IsICult 2004). However, it is mainly France 5 – which shares 
frequencies with the high-brow Franco-German joint venture channel Arte, which acts as 
                                                 
1Information concerning these case studies was largely extracted from my recently published book Public Television in 
the Digital Era (Iosifidis 2007). 
a guardian of programme quality and diversity, whereas the programming of France 2 
and France 3 increasingly emulates that of private rivals.  
Table 1 compares the annual output of the public channels with that of the 
national terrestrial commercial channels. It can be seen that France 5, which is tasked 
with promoting knowledge, culture and employment, devotes as much as 80 per cent of 
its schedule to current affairs magazines and documentaries. In direct contrast, France 2’s 
programming consists mainly of TV series and docudrama (25.1 per cent), entertainment 
and music shows (17.5 per cent), while a large proportion is devoted to news (21.1 per 
cent) and current affairs/documentaries (17.9 per cent). France 3’s schedule pays more 
emphasis to current affairs/documentaries (27.8 per cent), TV series/docudrama (25.6 per 
cent), as well as to national and regional news (16.7 per cent). The central news bulletin 
is at seven o’clock in the evening and has a large audience, being watched by working 
people and the elderly. The age groups that watch France Télévisions are generally older 
than those that watch commercial programmes. Taken together, the programming of the 
main public channels France 2 and France 3 differs only slightly from that of the private 
TF-1 and M6, which give some more emphasis to entertainment and TV 
series/docudrama (see Table 1). 
TO COMP: Insert Table 1 here 
The relatively small difference between the main public and private channels is 
because public broadcasters are increasingly dominated by commercial concerns and 
managed as private corporations. Their programming over the years tends to resemble 
those of their commercial counterparts, with the notable exception of France 5 and Arte 
(EUMAP 2005). A pan-European study by Leon (2004) found that there are still some 
differences between French public and commercial broadcasters in the area of cultural 
programming. Using a wide concept of culture, the study showed that France 2 and 
France 3 had more cultural output than their competitors TF-1 and M6, but in prime-time 
the public channels’ programming showed a strong orientation towards entertainment, 
and information to a lesser extent.  
This is evidenced by France 2’s programming policy. In September 2000, 
hampered by a continual but not precipitous, fall in audience share, the flagship public 
channel made dramatic changes in its programming, especially at peak viewing times. A 
young director was put in charge of news, and drastically changed the format of the 
central evening news bulletin at eight o’clock in the afternoon. Preceding this bulletin 
there is now a talk show called On a tout essayé, presented by well-known comedians and 
DJs. Prior to these changes, France 2’s output consisted mainly of documentaries and 
educational programmes, but it now has more of an entertainment and less of an 
educational character. Overall, the cultural and educational programming of France 2 and 
France 3 represent about ten to twelve per cent of their total schedule. Yet, only a tiny 
part of this offering is available at peak time (18.00-23.00). 
Thematic portfolio. 
 Similarly to other large European public broadcasters, France Télévisions has set up 
several thematic subscription channels, including: 
• Festival – set up in 1996 and shows French and European fiction). France Télévisions 
owns 56 per cent of the capital, the Spanish La 7 owns eleven per cent and another 
eleven per cent share is held by Britain’s Carlton Communications. 
• Mezzo – a music service founded in 1998. 
• Ma Planete. 
• Planete Thalassa. 
Historie, broadcasting documentaries, was set up in 1997 but sold to TF-1 Group 
in 2002. Apart from these subscription channels, France Télévisions is an owner (together 
with 19 more public channels) of Euronews, the Europe-wide satellite channel which 
broadcasts international news, as well as in the international French-language channel 
TV5, co-financed by Belgium, Canada and Switzerland, specialising in news and 
entertainment. Up to 2001 the public broadcaster had an 8.5 per cent share in the digital 
satellite platform TPS but this was sold in January 2002 to the commercial rival TF-1, as 
part of the restructuring and deficit reduction programme outlined above. 
Development of DTT. 
 Digital terrestrial television was launched in March 2005, two years later than originally 
scheduled. In addition to political upheavals, it had to overcome conflicts between 
technical standards – MPEG-2 and MPEG-4 were the prime contenders – and differences 
between France Télévisions, TF-1 and Canal Plus. The service entitled TNT and the 
initial offering consisted of 14 free-to-air channels while later in the year two bouquets of 
pay-TV were added. Take-up of services exceeded expectations and by June 2007 about 
8.2-million households were equipped to receive DTT, bringing the DTT penetration to 
22 per cent of French TV households. This is significant given that DTT was only 
launched in March 2005. This early success was partly because the set-top boxes were 
made available from as little as 70 Euros, and partly because the offering was sufficiently 
convincing to make people forget the earlier hesitancy. In fact, the offering improved 
substantially with the launch of additional channels to match the variety offered by the 
satellite consortia. 
The Greek Case 
TV broadcasting in Greece was developed in the late 1960s during a military junta which 
ruled the country between 1967 and 1974 and this impacted greatly on the degree of 
independence enjoyed by the public broadcaster. Throughout the 1980s, as Greece began 
to reform and modernise, audiences demanded a wider choice of their viewing options 
than those offered by the Greek public broadcaster Elliniki Radiofonia Tileorasi (ERT). 
In the late 1980s private TV broadcasters MEGA and ANT1 took advantage of loopholes 
in the existing legislation and began broadcasting programming mainly consisting of 
variety shows, American films and tabloid news broadcasts. ERT was forced, completely 
unprepared, into a regime of unregulated liberalisation where competition was expanding 
explosively. ERT’s bureaucratic organisation and the frequent changes in administration, 
all made its programming and the efficient exploitation of its resources difficult. The 
absence, furthermore, of any strategic planning in the company, which should have 
responded to social and technological shifts during the critical phase of abolition of state 
monopoly and the appearance of private television, marginalised ERT’s development, 
and alienated it from the public. The arrival of advertising funded private channels 
resulted in an unprecedented reduction in ERT’s audience share to below 10 per cent, as 
well as the loss of 80 per cent of its advertising revenue in the 10-year period 1989–1999. 
However, important steps have been taken in the last few years in reforming ERT so as to 
move it on to the next phase of its modernisation. 
Restructuring efforts. 
 In the past three decades certain studies have been carried out and proposals have been 
put forward referring mainly to the organisational and administrative modernisation of 
ERT. Sir Hugh Green’s proposals in 1975, the study by the BBC experts Alan Hart, 
Michael Johnson and Peter Marshount in 1990, the findings of Ernst and Young 
consultants in 1992, as well as the proposals of the Panhellenic Confederation of Trades 
Unions of ERT (P.O.S.P./ERT) in 1997, all highlighted ERT’s operational, organisational 
and financial difficulties. The conclusions of these studies boiled down to the following: 
ERT was characterised by centralised decision-making and lack of clarity in objectives 
and allocation of responsibilities; the main services ERT-1 and ERT-2 (now ET-1 and 
NET) operated autonomously and were never integrated into a unified, coordinated ERT 
A.E. There was also overlap in programming between ERT’s services; political 
interference and frequent changes of personnel in strategic managerial positions hindered 
the smooth operation of the company; the general directorate of administration and 
management was disproportionately large compared to the other directorates; there was 
no administrative mechanism to evaluate the performance of organisational units and to 
create incentives to improve it (for example, through cost reduction); ERT did not have 
the necessary marketing and sales infrastructure; the work of the Director General was 
significantly overloaded, as 16 organisational units report directly to him. 
The studies’ recommendations for the organisational improvement of ERT 
(particularly that of Ernst and Young 1992) can be summarised as follows: ERT should 
set up a unified general directorate of news and current affairs and a unified general 
directorate of programme production; the general directorate of administration and 
management should be split into three general directorates: technical, financial and 
administrative services; ERT should establish an internal body to assess performance in 
programme production; the public broadcaster should re-position and change the profile 
of the three public television networks: shaping ET-1 into a general interest channel, NET 
into mainly news network and transforming ET-3 into a regional  channel; ERT should 
pay more emphasis in producing programming for the youth market and women, as well 
as output aiming at households in semi-urban regions and the countryside; steps should 
be taken towards the reinforcement of ERT’s programme quality and objectivity, the 
cornerstones of its distinct, non-competitive nature vis-à-vis private television. 
Without doubt, public television, as seen from the recommendations of the studies 
above, many of which have been implemented, has significantly improved in recent years 
and in general terms has become more accountable, with a change of character, change of 
mentality in the way it is run, and some independence from asphyxiating state control. 
Contributing decisively to this was the formation of a strategic management plan for the 
5-year period 1998–2003 (the first in the company’s history) carried out by consultants 
KPMG, aiming at the organisational, managerial and financial renovation of ERT. In 
KPMG’s 2003 assessment of the plan, it is stated that the company met most of the 
economic objectives (reduce debt through a share capital increase from the state) without 
extra funding (the level of the annual licence fee between 1997–2002 remained 
unchanged at 36 Euros per household). In more particular, the following were completed 
and achieved: paying off the company’s accumulated debt and the drawing up of its first 
profitable balance sheet; development of a new service organisation for the company, 
with a significant reduction in the number of departments; completion of a study for the 
development of ERT’s property portfolio, as well as the organisation of its archives; 
passing a law for the early retirement of 1100 permanent employees of ERT. This last 
scheme deserves a more detailed analysis as it brought organisational and financial 
benefits to the company in terms of operational costs and allowed ERT to invest more in 
programming which in turn resulted in a rise of the audience share.   
The implementation of the early retirement programme. 
 One of the major, chronic problems of ERT has been the large number of its permanent 
staff. In 1996 its permanent workforce numbered 3500 people, a rather large figure which 
left scant margin for improvement in ERT’s finances by producing a serious competitive 
disadvantage. It is striking that in the period 1996–1997, around 75 per cent of ERT’s 
revenues were used to cover operational expenses and workforce costs, while the 
remaining 25 per cent was available for investments in new technologies and programme 
production. At the end of the 1990s the state took measures to face up to this bureaucratic 
situation. More specifically, Law 2747 of 1999 made provision for the implementation of 
a programme of early retirement of the ERT’s personnel (voluntary and compulsory). 
The early retirement programme started in December 1999 and with the consent of trade 
unions in the four-year period 1999–2002 a total of 826 employees left the company. Up 
until June 2000 the monthly benefit accruing from this staff reduction, in relative prices, 
came to 1.7 million Euros, while the annual benefits totaled 24 million Euros. However, 
in 2003 ERT had an obligation to pay 96 million Euros in the form of pensions to the 
retired employees (KPMG 2003).  
The implementation of the early retirement programme has both brought financial 
benefits to the company and contributed to a reversal in the ratio of operational cost 
versus investment in programming, which in all previous years was dominated by 
operational cost. An increase in investment spend is essential in the new era, as ERT has 
already started to modernise and digitalise its network. This increase in spend on 
entertainment, news, education and training programmes has increased ratings and added 
prestige to the company. But the early retirement programme has also offered an 
opportunity to restructure the workforce and to place employees in positions depending 
on their qualifications and experience. According to a former ERT Director General, its 
personnel was badly distributed across organisational posts, with the result that in some 
places there was over-supply and in others a serious lack (Panagiotou 2000).  
Next phase of ERT’s modernisation. 
 It is clear that important steps have been taken in this thorough-going renovation of 
ERT, without of course meaning that its organisational and operational problems have 
been overcome completely, for the public broadcaster has to go through the next phase of 
modernisation. In fact, KPMG was contracted by ERT to carry out a new 5-year strategic 
management plan to cover the period 2003–2008 which includes the following 
objectives: upgrading ERT’s infrastructure to meet the requirements of the digital era; 
improving financial performance through further structural change and rationalisation. 
This will enable the company both to invest in digital technologies and repay the 96 
million Euro debt to retired staff; reinvestment of revenues into programme production to 
increase public acceptance and achieve a total share of 20 per cent by 2008; introducing a 
mechanism to measure performance in terms of programmes provided to make it more 
accountable to the public (KPMG 2003). According to the consultants, the above actions 
will generate in the 5-year period 2003–2008 a sum of 235 million Euros, which both can 
be used to cover pensions to the staff due to early retirement and allow ERT to prepare 
for the digital age. Precondition for this was the increase in the annual licence fee (which 
the government accepted) and RPI + 1 per cent increase in the licence fee per annum 
(which was not agreed). A second precondition was the reformation of the regulatory 
regime, particularly with regards to defining with more clarity ERT’s public service 
obligations. At the time of writing no action has been taken in this area.       
Programming strategy. 
 In addition to sorting out its balance sheets, ERT improved its programming offerings 
especially in the areas of news and current affairs, as evidenced by the creation of the 
news and current affairs service NET (which replaced ERT-2). This enabled the company 
to gain back a significant number of viewers. Table 2 gives us a snapshot of the trends in 
audience shares in the period 1992–05, indicating that ERT went up by about seven 
percentage points in 2005 compared to its performance in 1995, thanks to a restructuring 
plan which changed the programming profile of the two main services (ET-1 became a 
general interest and NET a purely news channel) so there is no longer any overlap 
between them (see below). 
TO COMP: Place Table 2 here. 
But the situation was very different in the early days of market liberalisation. The 
introduction of competition between the public and private TV channels led ERT to 
compromise on quality by increasing programme homogeneity and limiting viewer 
choice. This is the outcome of an empirical study conducted by Tsourvakas (2004), 
which analysed ERT’s programming strategy before and after TV market liberalisation. 
The findings suggest that the PTV broadcaster changed its strategy to offer types of 
programmes similar to their private counterparts, shifting the focus of its programming 
strategy from an informational direction to a more commercial orientation. While during 
1987–1989 (just before competition) ERT pursued an informational profile, immediately 
after the entry of private channels (1989–1992) it paid more attention to entertainment 
programmes, such as foreign and Greek police series, foreign and Greek sitcoms, Greek 
movies and game shows – basically similar programme types of those offered by its 
private rivals. 
Yet in more recent years ERT embarked upon an ambitious restructuring plan to 
change the profiles of its three services. Under that plan initiated in the late 1990s, ET-1 
became the mainstream channel appealing to a broad audience, NET operated solely as a 
news channel and ET-3 became a regional service covering events from Northern Greece. 
These changes are reflected in Table 3 which shows that since the period 1998–1999 
news and current affairs have dominated NET’s output. In contrast, ET-1’s programming 
contains diverse genres to appeal to a broad audience.  
TO COMP: Place Table 3 here. 
Table 4 demonstrates that the era of programming convergence between public 
and private channels has come to an end, for public channels differ tangibly from their 
private counterparts in terms of types of programmes broadcast. In particular in 2004–
2005 the three public channels covered a far greater amount of news/information, 
children’s programming and arts/culture than commercial channels. The latter paid 
emphasis on news/information, but also on series, films and light entertainment. 
TO COMP: Place Table 4 here. 
Digital initiatives. 
 The public broadcaster is lagging behind compared with its European counterparts in 
terms of involvement in digital activities, for it only launched digital terrestrial television 
services in 2006, to bring it in line with West European patterns. In more particular, in 
March 2006 ERT began broadcasts of ERT Psifiaki (ERT Digital), a bouquet of three 
thematic TV services broadcasting digitally, initially in the capital Athens, the second 
largest city Thessalonika and central Greece. The services include CINE+ (movies), 
SPOR+ (sport channel) and PRISMA+ (focusing on people with special needs). These 
channels are free-to-air and their reception only requires the purchase of a set-top box.. 
ERT’s involvement in digital terrestrial television is expected to accelerate consumer 
take-up of digital services (especially if the public broadcaster takes advantage of its rich 
audiovisual archives to offer a complete range of programmes), thus making more 
achievable the government’s target of switching off the analogue frequency by 2012. 
Conclusion 
This article provided a brief exposition of the state of play in European public television 
and compiled data from one large and one small European country to exemplify some 
relevant points. In more particular, it examined the programming strategies, digital 
initiatives and internal restructuring attempts of the public channels operating in France 
and Greece. The aim was to use the experience of these two countries to reach more 
general conclusions regarding the readiness of public television stations to adapt to the 
multi-channel digital era. The limited number of countries selected for the purposes of 
this article may be problematic in drawing general conclusions about the policies and 
strategies employed by public channels. Nevertheless, the thorough analysis of the 
national case studies, along with the careful initial selection of countries and personal 
observations, ensures that research into public television in each country is based on 
reliable and comparative data, and thus, constitutes a firm basis on which to identify 
future prospects for public television at the pan-European level. Given the above analysis, 
we can assume that a group of PTV broadcasters from mainly larger European countries 
(France Télévisions in France, the BBC in Britain and TVE in Spain), but also smaller 
countries of Northern Europe (SVT in Sweden and YLE in Finland), have been active by 
investing in online services and creating interactive web sites, launching ‘niche’ channels 
and reaching agreements with other public and even commercial channels for the joint 
production and promotion of new services (although there are striking differences 
between them, with the BBC in the forefront in introducing new services). In the majority 
of cases, these initiatives were combined with attempts to reorganise internally, but also 
to save resources, at times requiring unpopular measures (dismissing superfluous 
personnel). In these countries, public television managed to defend its principles, justify 
its public service mission and cope with competition from private channels. 
A second group of PTV broadcasters, coming mainly from the smaller Southern 
European countries of Greece and Portugal, but also Ireland, find themselves still at the 
review and planning stage. Activity in new technologies is limited and important steps 
towards internal reform have only recently commenced. Undoubtedly market size and the 
social and political context embedded in these smaller countries play a defining role in 
the decision to enter new, unfamiliar and commercially risky activities. For example, in 
Greece television took its first steps under a dictatorship regime and was openly used for 
propaganda purposes. The restoration of democracy found the medium wounded, lacking 
vision and not trusted by the Greek public. This explains to some extent the Greek 
broadcaster ERT’s limited involvement in new technologies and the late adoption of 
organisational reform strategies. The Greek situation contrasts sharply with that in other 
small European countries, particularly the Nordic ones, which have been characterised by 
political independence, involvement in new services and early restructuring attempts.  
Political upheaval was also one of the reasons for the late launch of DTT in France, 
alongside industry indecision concerning standards. 
With regards to programming, multi-channel growth and declining share 
has left some public channels, including those under investigation, with no choice 
but to replicate services of commercial competitors. Adapting to declining 
audiences by scheduling similar programmes to their commercial rivals would 
result not only in less viewer choice but would also constitute a distortion of the 
market in so far as the public channels use public money to fund programmes that 
the market provides in abundance. The strategy of the so-called ‘programming 
convergence’, adapted by the Greek PTV broadcaster (but also by most of the 
Southern European ones) in the early days of TV market liberalisation led to 
marginalisation and alienated it from its viewers. PTV broadcasters should 
address the full range of audience interests and remain a major engine of offering 
original, home grown high-quality output, rather than recycled or bought-in 
mainstream programmes. Public service content in the digital age is not abundant 
as some technology gurus predicted, but scarce. Public channels should, therefore, 
be more relevant, more rooted to people’s lives and serve as a model for all 
broadcasters, by catering for innovation in programming, providing diverse, 
independent news and offering thematic channels of plural content in an 
accessible and affordable manner To be able to achieve these objectives they 
should operate under a secure and stable funding model. 
Programming is only one area in which PTV broadcasters need to improve to 
ensure the genuine support of the public for their continued existence. Other areas include 
internal restructuring to make public institutions more cost efficient and effective but 
without sacrificing their public service values. France Télévisions and ERT’s cases are 
striking. The change of the Greek public broadcaster’s management practices (suggested 
in the KPMG’s report) enabled ERT to gain professional competence. In the highly 
competitive nature of the contemporary Greek TV market, where television is the single 
most important medium of political information, ERT provides a degree of pluralism and 
equity in the amount of political coverage. The French PTV broadcaster has also been 
benefited by a major restructuring programme which led to the formation of France 
Télévisions to combine the resources of the public channels. This change has improved 
the organisational and operational profile of the now joint stock company and led to a 
better exploitation of programmes and personnel. 
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TF-1 (%) M6 (%) 




17.9 27.8 80.1 17.4 5.3 




25.1 25.6 9.7 31.4 35.2 
Entertainment/ 17.5 9.0 2.2 16 35.1 
music shows 




9.0 10.5 7.1 15.7 16.1 
Total hours 8,870 8,155 5,845 8,760 8,760 
[Source: CSA, company reports, EUMAP; 2005] 
Note: Being mostly a movie channel, Canal Plus is not included. 
Table 2. Annual per cent audience shares of the Greek TV channels (1992–2005). 
Year ET-1 NET ET-3 ANT1 MEGA Alpha Star Alter 
1992 10.5 5.9 2.5 30.7 33.6 – – – 
1995 4.7 3.3 1.0 25.5 25.6 10.8 11.7 – 
1998 6.1 4.0 1.2 24.1 21.2 15.8 14.3 – 
2001 5.9 4.1 1.5 22.9 21.3 14.6 12.7 3.2 
2005 4.2 8.7 2.0 20.6 18.4 13.1 11.6 10.8 
[Source: AGB Nielsen Media Research; 2005]<<?5>> 
Notes: NET was previously named ET-2 and Alpha was previously named Sky. 
Table 3. ERT’s programming mix by genre (1998–1999 and 2004–2005). 
Genres ET1 (1998–
1999 ; %) 
ET1 (2004–
2005 ; %) 
NET (1998–
1999 ; %) 
NET (2004–
2005 ; %) 
Series 10.8 3.0 1.7 9.6 
Films 20.0 7.3 8.0 11.4 
Light 
entertainment 
1.3 0.3 0.3 0.4 
Arts/culture 5.7 12.1 11.3 3.8 
News/information 35.5 50.9 76.7 66.7 
Children 11.8 13.2 0.3 1.3 
Sports 10.9 7.7 2.7 5.6 
Other 3.9 5.5 0.7 1.2 
[Source: AGB Nielsen Media Research; 2005] 
Table 4. Programming mix by genre – ERT, MEGA, ANT1 (2004–2005). 
GENRES ET1 (%) NET (%) ET3 (%) MEGA (%) ANT1 (%) 
Series 3.0 9.6 1.0 28.1 26.2 
Films 7.3 11.4 6.3 19.5 14.1 
Light 
entertainment 
0.3 0.4 0.4 6.5 6.7 
Arts/culture 12.1 3.8 9.8 1.1 0.7 
News/information 50.9 66.7 65.3 39.3 45.6 
Childrens 13.2 1.3 3.6 1.1 2.1 
Sports 7.7 5.6 9.7 1.8 2.2 
Other 5.5 1.2 3.9 2.7 2.4 
[Source: AGB Nielsen Media Research; 2005] 
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